A game-theoretic model of endogenous public policies

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

19 Scopus citations

Abstract

Public policies are the equilibrium outcome of a cooperative game among interest groups and the policy maker. This study stresses the interdependence between policies and players’ bargaining strengths and derives their comparative statics with respect to a changing economic environment. It also provides a specification of behavioral equations consistent with the underlying bargaining process. An analysis of the political economy of food and agricultural price policies in Senegal illustrates the proposed framework.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)138-148
Number of pages11
JournalAmerican Journal of Agricultural Economics
Volume72
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 1990
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Bargaining game
  • Endogenous policies
  • Interest group

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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