Abstract
A perennial topic in industrial economics is collusion. Kwoka and Ravenscraft (1986) developed a model to measure the collusiveness of conjectures across industries as a function of intra-industry rivalry among leading firms. But extensive literature suggests that the degree of collusion may also depend upon underlying market characteristics. We modify the Kwoka and Ravenscraft model to account for this. Our results suggest that underlying market characteristics do matter. Intra-industry rivalry and conjectures vary with the level and stability of concentration, and to a lesser degree with product homogeneity.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 823-838 |
Number of pages | 16 |
Journal | Review of Industrial Organization |
Volume | 9 |
Issue number | 6 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 1994 |
Keywords
- Collusion
- conjectures
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Strategy and Management
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
- Management of Technology and Innovation