How should we incentivize private landowners to 'produce' more biodiversity?

Nick Hanley, Simanti Banerjee, Gareth D. Lennox, Paul R. Armsworth

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

129 Scopus citations

Abstract

Globally, much biodiversity is found on private land. Acting to conserve such biodiversity thus requires the design of policies which influence the decision-making of farmers and foresters. In this paper, we outline the economic characteristics of this problem, before reviewing a number of policy options, such as conservation auctions and conservation easements. We then discuss a number of policy design problems, such as the need for spatial coordination and the choice between paying for outcomes rather than actions, before summarizing what the evidence and theory developed to date tell us about those aspects of biodiversity policy design which need careful attention from policy-makers and environmental regulators.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article numbergrs002
Pages (from-to)93-113
Number of pages21
JournalOxford Review of Economic Policy
Volume28
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 2012
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Agglomeration bonus
  • Biodiversity
  • Conservation auctions
  • Conservation easements
  • Economic instruments
  • Payments for ecosystem services

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

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