TY - GEN
T1 - Preference-based resource allocation
T2 - 10th International Conference on the Economics of Grids, Clouds, Systems, and Services, GECON 2013
AU - Haas, Christian
AU - Kimbrough, Steven O.
AU - Caton, Simon
AU - Weinhardt, Christof
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2013 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - The allocation of resources between providers to consumers is a well-known problem and has received significant attention, typically using notions of monetary exchanges. In this paper, we study resource matching in settings without monetary transactions by using a two-sided matching approach, e.g., in social and collaborative environments where users define preferences for with whom they may be matched. Whereas two-sided matching for strict and complete preference rankings (i.e., without indifferences) has been extensively studied, it is known that the matching problem is NP-hard for more realistic preference structures. We study, via simulation, the applicability of a heuristic procedure in settings with indiffernces in preferences, and compare its performance to existing algorithms. We study performance metrics like fairness and welfare in addition to the classic stability objective. Our results show interesting trade-offs between performance metrics and promising performance of the heuristic.
AB - The allocation of resources between providers to consumers is a well-known problem and has received significant attention, typically using notions of monetary exchanges. In this paper, we study resource matching in settings without monetary transactions by using a two-sided matching approach, e.g., in social and collaborative environments where users define preferences for with whom they may be matched. Whereas two-sided matching for strict and complete preference rankings (i.e., without indifferences) has been extensively studied, it is known that the matching problem is NP-hard for more realistic preference structures. We study, via simulation, the applicability of a heuristic procedure in settings with indiffernces in preferences, and compare its performance to existing algorithms. We study performance metrics like fairness and welfare in addition to the classic stability objective. Our results show interesting trade-offs between performance metrics and promising performance of the heuristic.
KW - Heuristics
KW - Multiple Objectives
KW - Preferences with Indifferences
KW - Two-Sided Matching
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84886436131&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84886436131&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-02414-1_11
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-02414-1_11
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84886436131
SN - 9783319024134
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 149
EP - 160
BT - Economics of Grids, Clouds, Systems, and Services - 10th International Conference, GECON 2013, Proceedings
Y2 - 18 September 2013 through 20 September 2013
ER -