The political economy of food standard determination: International evidence from maximum residue limits

Yuan Li, Bo Xiong, John C. Beghin

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

Food safety standards have proliferated as multilateral and bilateral trade agreements constrain traditional barriers to agricultural trade. Stringent food standards can be driven by rising consumer and public concern about food safety and other social objectives, or by the lobbying efforts from domestic industries in agriculture. We investigate the economic and political determinants of the maximum residue limits (MRLs) on pesticides and veterinary drugs. Using a political economy framework and econometric investigation, we find that nations with higher income and larger population adopt stricter MRLs. We also find that countries set more stringent MRLs in their more competitive sectors. Moreover, we show that MRLs and import tariffs are policy substitutes for policy makers. Finally, we find that countries with higher regulatory quality set tougher food standards.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationNontariff Measures and International Trade
PublisherWorld Scientific Publishing Co. Pte Ltd
Pages239-267
Number of pages29
ISBN (Electronic)9789813144415
ISBN (Print)9789813144408
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 28 2016
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Codex
  • Food safety
  • Maximum residue limits
  • Non-tariff measures
  • Political economy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Social Sciences(all)

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